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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION ( 1 055 **COMMISSIONERS** 2 MIKE GLEASON - CHAIRMAN 7011 mm 19 P 3: 53 WILLIAM A. MUNDELL 3 JEFF HATCH-MILLER 4 KRISTIN K. MAYES **GARY PIERCE** 5 6 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF ) DOCKET NO. E-04204A-06-0783 7 UNS ELECTRIC, INC. FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUST AND REASONABLE RATES AND CHARGES 8 DESIGNED TO REALIZE A REASONABLE 9 RATE OF RETURN ON THE FAIR VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES OF UNS ELECTRIC, INC. **DEVOTED TO ITS OPERATIONS** 10 THROUGHOUT THE STATE OF ARIZONA 11 AND REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF RELATED FINANCING. 12 13 14 15 16 **REPLY POST-HEARING BRIEF** 17 OF UNS ELECTRIC, INC. 18 19 Arizona Corporation Commission 20 DOCKETED 21 NOV 19 2007 22 23 DOCKETED BY 24 25 26

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UNS Electric, Inc. ("UNS Electric" or "Company") through undersigned counsel, hereby submits its Reply Brief in support of the relief it seeks in this docket.

UNS Electric has proposed necessary and innovative measures to address its significant financial and operational challenges in providing reliable and safe electric service to customers at reasonable rates. At the same time it is facing substantial growth in its service area, the Company also must replace its entire power supply portfolio and refinance all of its long-term debt. As a result of these unique and demanding circumstances, the relief sought by UNS Electric is critical for the Company to be able to maintain its financial integrity, to continue to have access to capital on reasonable terms and to acquire a diverse and economic power supply portfolio. degradation of the company's financial position will result in increased costs and higher rates in the long run.

Staff and RUCO, unfortunately, recommend denying much of what the Company seeks. In doing so, both parties adhere to traditional ratemaking principles without considering the unique circumstances that UNS Electric faces and the undisputed evidence in this case. Although Staff's and RUCO's opposition is often a summary assertion that the Company has not met its burden of proof, the Company has, in fact, provided substantial and undisputed evidence – and more than met its burden of proof – justifying: (1) Construction Work in Progress ("CWIP") in rate base; (2) full recovery of its operating expenses, including payroll expense, incentive compensation, and rate case expense; (3) an authorized return on equity of 11.80 percent; (4) a fair rate of return on Fair Value Rate Base that comports with Arizona law; (5) mandatory time-of-use, inverted block rate design and rate consolidation; (6) a Purchased Power and Fuel Adjustment Clause ("PPFAC") that provides full and timely recovery of all costs associated with procuring fuel and purchased power; and (7) necessary rate base treatment and rate reclassification for the Black Mountain Generation Station ("BMGS") that will allow the Company to acquire the asset as part of its new power supply portfolio.

Without approval of its requests in this docket, UNS Electric will have no choice but to file another rate case in very short order. And it will lose a unique opportunity to acquire an important

generation asset that would help to diversify its power portfolio. UNS Electric urges the Commission to grant the full relief UNS Electric requests in this case.

UNS Electric's Initial Post-Hearing Brief anticipated and addressed many of the arguments the other parties raised in their opening briefs. This Reply Brief focuses on key issues relating to UNS Electric's ability to effectively address the demands it faces in its service area. For all issues, UNS Electric maintains its position as set forth in its Initial Post-Hearing Brief.

## I. UNS ELECTRIC'S REVENUE REQUIREMENT.

#### A. Rate Base Issues.

The Company stands by its position on all rate base issues discussed in its Initial Post-Hearing Brief. The evidence shows UNS Electric's Original Cost Rate Base ("OCRB") to be \$141,036,562 and its Fair Value Rate Base ("FVRB") to be \$177,847,579. The Company further incorporates all its arguments from its Initial Post-Hearing Brief and will not repeat all of those arguments here. Rather, the Company will focus on (1) CWIP; (2) Accumulated Depreciation; and (3) Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes.

# 1. The evidence fully justifies inclusion of CWIP to protect and preserve UNS Electric's financial integrity.

In requesting the inclusion of CWIP in rate base, UNS Electric presented compelling and uncontroverted evidence about the unique and exceptional financial circumstances that the Company is facing. First, UNS Electric has experienced unprecedented growth in its service territory requiring the Company to expend millions of dollars to ensure safe and reliable service. Second, that growth does not pay for itself; rather it creates an annually recurring revenue deficiency of \$4.8 million. Third, the Company has no base load generation and its current full requirements power contract expires in May 2008, requiring the Company to spend millions of dollars more to acquire replacement power. And, fourth, within the next twelve months, the Company will have to refinance all of its long-term debt, in the amount of \$60 million. These are extraordinary and unique circumstances that even Staff witness Ralph Smith has acknowledged

have not occurred for a utility in Arizona before.1

However, in response, neither Staff nor RUCO take these unprecedented circumstances into account. Although neither party refutes the facts underlying UNS Electric's need for CWIP in rate base, both parties continue to argue general rate making principles that simply do not recognize the gravity of the situation facing UNS Electric. And though both Staff and RUCO acknowledge that allowing CWIP in rate base may be appropriate in certain circumstances, both continue to rely on vague standards and summarily conclude that UNS Electric has simply not met the standard. For example, Staff continues to assert that UNS Electric must be in "financial distress" before CWIP should be allowed in rate base. Staff's undefined "financial distress" is not a standard that has been or should be embraced by this Commission. By waiting until a company is in financial distress, the damage already will have been done through higher costs of capital, increased costs of power supply due to insufficient credit support and potentially delayed infrastructure improvements due to lack of access to sufficient capital. Rather, the Commission should look to maintain the financial integrity of the Company to ensure that it will continue to have access to capital on reasonable terms and will able to procure power supply resources at reasonable costs.

The unrefuted evidence in the record presents compelling reason to include CWIP in rate base. UNS Electric witness Mr. Kentton Grant provided extensive evidence about how the Company has faced, and will face, continued high growth in its service territory.<sup>2</sup> The Company's growth in net plant investment was 68.6 percent from 2004 to 2006; APS, by contrast, experienced only 28.9 percent growth over this same period.<sup>3</sup> So, the Company must raise large sums of money to fund necessary plant growth.<sup>4</sup> The evidence is that, from 2005 to 2009, the Company projects its capitalization to grow from \$115 million to \$212 million.<sup>5</sup> Net plant leads to additional fixed costs, and growth is driving capital requirements far in excess of the Company's internal cash

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Tr. (R. Smith) at 1207.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ex. UNSE-35 (Grant Rebuttal) at Ex. KCG-10 and KCG-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ex. UNSE-35 (Grant Rebuttal) at 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Ex. UNSE-35 (Grant Rebuttal) at 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Ex. UNSE-34 (Grant Direct) at 27, Ex. KCG-9.

flow. The Company's financial integrity erodes because of higher capital costs associated with 1 2 3

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25 Ex. UNSE-35 (Grant Rebuttal) at 13.

larger capital outlays. Further, net cash flow as a percentage of capital expenditures was 51 percent less than the industry average. Finally, Mr. Grant also provided evidence that new growth in the twelve months following the test year caused a \$4.8 million annual revenue deficiency.8

The Company also presented unrefuted evidence that it must significantly improve its cash flow and that it needs CWIP in rate base to meet that need. As Mr. Grant testified, annual cash flow after capital expenditures fell from negative \$447,000 in 2004 to negative \$9,414,000 in 2005 - and is expected to drop precipitously to negative \$31,131,000 in 2007.9 The Company would have a speculative grade credit rating if it was rated. 10 UNS Electric must refinance all \$60 million of its long-term debt in August of 2008. And the Company must replace its entire power supply by June of 2008. Adding CWIP in rate base would add \$2.1 million in additional annual revenues. 11 CWIP in rate base is necessary for UNS Electric to preserve its financial integrity by improving its cash flow and earnings and to enable the Company to meet the extraordinary financial circumstances it is facing.

Although its discussion of CWIP is minimal, Staff makes several assertions that ignore the record. First, Staff generally asserts, at page 5 of its Post-Hearing Brief, that CWIP can result in a mismatch, particularly if the CWIP produces additional revenue related to growth. However, Staff (and RUCO) fail to acknowledge that a large portion of the CWIP is non-revenue producing, nonexpense reducing plant – even though Staff acknowledged that fact on the record. UNS Electric's Initial Post-Hearing Brief, at page 11, lines 6 to 16, sets forth the record evidence that approximately \$5.6 million of CWIP avoids Staff's asserted mismatch problem. Additionally, even if the remaining \$5.2 million of test year CWIP projects are indeed revenue producing, the evidence is clear that the incremental revenues generated by plant investment are dwarfed by the

Ex. UNSE-35 (Grant Rebuttal) at Ex. KCG-12, page 2.

Ex. UNSE-35 (Grant Rebuttal) at Ex. KCG-10, page 2.

Ex. UNSE-34 (Grant Direct) at 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Ex. UNSE-34 (Grant Direct) at 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ex. UNSE-34 (Grant Direct) at 27.

increase in fixed costs borne by UNS Electric (i.e. the annually recurring revenue deficiency of \$4.8 million). If there is any "mismatch" that the Commission should be concerned about, it is the 2 mismatch between costs and revenues that is occurring year after year at UNS Electric as a result 3 of growth, and not a mismatch that is purported to have occurred in a test year that is already 17 4 months old. 5

Second, Staff incorrectly infers, at page 5, line 21 of its Post-Hearing Brief, that the Company will receive a return on its CWIP through Allowance for Funds Used During Construction ("AFUDC"). In fact, without CWIP in rate base, UNS Electric will continue to experience a large revenue deficiency on the CWIP balance. As shown in Attachment 2 to UNS Electric's Initial Brief, \$8.7 million out of the \$10.8 million in the CWIP balance is already in service and the Company is no longer accruing AFUDC on that amount.

Third, Staff asserts, at page 6 of its Post-Hearing Brief, that UNS Electric is viewed as low risk by ratings agencies and does not need CWIP because it can attract capital based on the credit quality of its parent. However, Staff's position is flawed because it (i) is based on an out-dated rating agency report issued when there were still 5 years left on the Pinnacle West contract and (ii) fails to recognize that the UNS Electric's parent company has not issued any guarantee of UNS Electric's obligations.<sup>12</sup> In fact, as set forth in detail at pages 41 through 44 of its Initial Brief, UNS Electric is decidedly riskier than comparable companies.

Finally, the Commission's decisions regarding allowing CWIP for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, in fact, support UNS Electric's request. In Decision No. 54247, the Commission concluded that including CWIP is not contrary to rational and fair economic pricing principles and that including moderate amounts of CWIP has "virtually no effect on the apportionment of risk between shareholder and ratepayer." The Decision also noted that including so-called short-term CWIP in rate base may be reasonable, and that the Commission had in previous decisions, included CWIP largely as a means of addressing critical cash flow problems

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UNSE-35 (Grant Rebuttal) at 26-27.
 Decision No. 54247 (November 28, 1984) at 17-18.

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for public service corporations or to prevent certain types of earnings attrition.<sup>14</sup> And in allowing Palo Verde CWIP in rate base, the Commission stated in Decision No. 54202 that "it would seem postponing a small increase today in favor of an even larger one tomorrow will do [some ratepayers] little good."<sup>15</sup> The Commission allowed \$260,000,000 Palo Verde CWIP in rate base, in part, to *preserve* APS' financial viability.<sup>16</sup>

The same rationale should be applied here based on the undisputed record. The Company faces difficult and unique challenges. In addition to meeting the demands of high growth, UNS Electric faces the prospect of having to refinance its long-term debt as well as procuring up to 450 MW capacity by June of 2008. Staff and RUCO ignore these critical facts when summarily disallowing CWIP from rate base. However, including CWIP in rate base is critical in allowing the Company to meet the rapid growth in its service area while supporting the Company's financial integrity and giving UNS Electric a reasonable opportunity to actually earn its authorized rate of return ("ROR"). 17

#### 2. The evidence supports the Company's accumulated depreciation.

Although the Company provided ample evidence in support of its accumulated depreciation and Staff has not disputed the Company's position, RUCO describes the Company's argument as "extensive rhetoric." In addition to the record evidence supporting the Company's accumulated depreciation, the Company proved numerous errors in RUCO witness Rodney Moore's accumulated depreciation calculation. For instance, Mr. Moore uses a mid-year convention that is not in accordance with the FERC Uniform System of Accounts ("USOA").<sup>18</sup> Instead, a mid-month convention is a more accurate convention to calculate accumulated depreciation. Mr. Moore and RUCO also failed to consider salvage or removal costs associated with assets retired from service.<sup>19</sup> RUCO depreciates transportation equipment using the group

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Decision No. 54247 at 17 (FN 12), 18-19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Decision No. 54204 at 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Decision No. 54204 at 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Neither Staff nor RUCO addressed post-test year plant or CWIP-related advances. UNS Electric stands by its Initial Post-Hearing Brief on those issues.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ex. UNSE-12 (Kissinger Rebuttal) at 10; Ex. UNSE-13 (Kissinger Rejoinder) at 1; Ex. UNSE-37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Ex. UNSE-12 (Kissinger Rebuttal) at 10.

method, when the unit method should have been used.<sup>20</sup> Finally, Exhibit UNSE-37 shows that Mr. Moore used *the wrong depreciation rate* for certain classes of transportation equipment.<sup>21</sup> These fundamental errors in Mr. Moore's analysis explain the difference between the Company and RUCO.

# 3. RUCO's proposed adjustments to Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes ("ADIT") ignore the evidence and the Commission's Rules.

RUCO argues that UNS Electric must follow the NARUC USOA in determining its ADIT. However, Commission Rule A.A.C. R14-2-212.G.2 expressly directs electric utilities to use FERC's USOA, which is *different* than NARUC's USOA. In particular, there is no Account 271 under FERC's USOA – which is the account that RUCO relies on under the NARUC USOA. The Company is required to directly credit the related plant or CWIP; there is no separate account to deduct from rate base.<sup>22</sup> Decision No. 55774 (October 21, 1987) also allows utilities to create a deferred tax asset and claim rate base treatment when using the self-pay method, which is exactly what the Company did.<sup>23</sup> Further, regarding ADIT for Administrative and General ("A&G"), the Company is proposing a *prospective* adjustment to A&G expense. But that does not affect the amount of ADIT A&G already accumulated.<sup>24</sup> Staff has not disputed the Company's ADIT (except to the extent it reflects CWIP in rate base – which is not RUCO's argument) and the Commission should adopt UNS Electric's adjustment for ADIT.

## B. Operating Income.

UNS Electric maintains its position on all Operating Income issues stated in its Initial Post-Hearing Brief. UNS Electric's adjusted Operating Income for the test year is \$8,770,016. The Company addressed most of its positions in its Initial Post-Hearing Brief and will not reiterate all of those positions and arguments here. However, the Company specifically responds to a few key issues regarding operating expenses below, including: (1) Payroll Expense; (2) Incentive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Ex. UNSE-12 (Kissinger Rebuttal) at 10-11.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Tr. (Moore) at 860-61, 867-68.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Ex. UNSE-13 (Kissinger Rejoinder) at 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Ex. UNSE-12 (Kissinger Rebuttal) at 6-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Ex. UNSE-12 (Kissinger Rebuttal) at 9.

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Ex. UNSE-25 (Dukes Rejoinder) at 11-12.
 Ex. UNSE-25 (Dukes Rejoinder) at 11; Tr. (Moore) at 901-02.
 Ex. UNSE-24 (Dukes Rebuttal) at 20.

Compensation, including the Performance Enhancement Plan, and the Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (3) Rate Case Expense; (4) Call Center Expenses; and (5) Other Expenses.

With respect to the determination of the Company's revenue requirement, the Commission must provide recovery for the Company's operating expenses and capital costs. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1943). Under the Arizona Constitution, the Commission is required "to allow a recovery for all reasonable expenses." Tucson Electric Power Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 132 Ariz. 240, 245, 645 P.2d 231, 236 (1982). Indeed, the Commission must provide sufficient income to permit full recovery of "operating costs" in addition to the return on rate base. Scates v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 118 Ariz. 531, 533-34, 578 P.2d 612, 614-15 (App. 1978). And a utility's expenses are presumed to be reasonable and incurred in good faith. West Ohio Gas Public Utility Comm'n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935). Once the utility established a prima facie case for the reasonableness of its operating expenses – by showing actual incurrence - then the burden shifts to other parties to show by substantial and competent evidence that the expenses are unreasonable by reason of inefficiency or bad faith. Boise Water Corp. v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 555 P.2d 163 (Idaho 1976).

#### 1. Payroll Expense.

The Company proposed two adjustments based on known and measurable changes occurring after the test year ended – an approach Staff endorsed in the UNS Gas rate case (Docket No. G-04204A-06-0463). First, the Company made a payroll adjustment to increase normalized payroll by three percent effective January 2007, for existing employee levels during the test year.<sup>25</sup> This adjustment relates to then-current employees providing service to existing customers during the test year. 26 Second, the Company proposed the same normalized overtime expense adjustment method here as Staff endorsed in the UNS Gas rate case.<sup>27</sup>

Staff has not addressed the payroll expense adjustment in its initial brief. apparently disagrees with the payroll expense adjustment for the pay increase but has not

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Ex. UNSE-24 (Dukes Rebuttal) at 6-7.
 Decision No. 69663 (June 28, 2007) at 36-37.

<sup>30</sup> Ex. UNSE-24 (Dukes Rebuttal) at 7-8.

addressed the overtime adjustment. For the reasons set forth in the UNS Electric's initial brief, the Company's payroll expense adjustment should be adopted.

#### Incentive Compensation and Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan 2. ("SERP")

UNS Electric requests to recover \$251,566 of operating expenses for the Company's Performance Enhancement Plan ("PEP"), Officer's Long-Term Incentive Program ("LTIP") and No Party argued that any of these programs led to employees or officers being SERP. overcompensated. The evidence is undisputed that the overall level of compensation is reasonable. 28 Therefore, the Commission should not disallow any portion of these programs.

## Performance Enhancement Plan and Officers Long-Term **Incentive Program**

The standard on whether to allow recovery of these costs is whether the costs are prudently-incurred, not who benefits from those costs. It could be argued that all costs benefit both ratepayers and shareholders. But it would clearly be unlawful to only allow 50 percent of all operating expenses in rates. The Commission should not rely on vague "equity principles" to justify a sharing of prudently-incurred costs for some expense categories, but not others. See Citizens Utilities Board v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 651 N.E.2d 1089 (Ill. 1995). Yet, that is effectively what Staff recommends with regards to the PEP, without any evidence to substantiate a RUCO's recommendation - to disallow all PEP expenses - is even more 50/50 sharing. egregious.

Staff's position is perplexing given that this Commission recently allowed Arizona Public Service Company ("APS") to recover all cash-based incentive compensation.<sup>29</sup> UNS Electric's PEP is similar to the APS program. The PEP consists of elements primarily intended to benefit the customers and puts a portion of employees' total compensation at risk as a means to encourage and enhance each employee's individual performance.<sup>30</sup> UNS Electric should be allowed full recovery of its PEP program just like APS.

Moreover, despite RUCO's assertion, at page 10 of its Closing Brief, that the test-year incentive compensation was out of the ordinary, the evidence is clear that at-risk compensation is a normal and recurring expense. The *only* reason a "Special Recognition Award ("SRA")" was awarded in 2005 – versus PEP compensation – was due to an unplanned outage beyond the employees' control.<sup>31</sup> All other PEP goals for 2005 were achieved.<sup>32</sup> The amount of the award per the SRA was less than the PEP payout would have been to employees. RUCO does not dispute that incentive compensation in general and the PEP in particular are necessary for UNS Electric to attract and retain quality employees; if incentive compensation did not exist, the Company must raise base compensation. PEP costs should be allowed in their entirety as the Company requests.

The Company's LTIP also provides direct benefits to customers and for the same reasons, full recovery of LTIP expenses is justified.

## b. Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan.

The Commission has allowed SERP expense in past cases when the overall compensation package to executives is not found to be excessive.<sup>33</sup> The same is true in this case. SERP is a reasonable operating expense and simply allows executives to be held harmless from the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") by allowing executives proportionally equivalent retirement benefits to all other employees.<sup>34</sup> SERPs are offered by 93 percent of general industry companies and 96 percent of energy/utility companies.<sup>35</sup> The Company must offer this program and stay competitive in attracting and retaining quality executives, who provide a direct benefit to the customers.<sup>36</sup> And here, the evidence is undisputed that the overall level of SERP expense is reasonable. The Commission should adopt its previous standard and allow SERP expenses as reasonable and not excessive.

<sup>25 | 31</sup> Ex. UNSE-24 (Dukes Rebuttal) at 29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Ex. UNSE-24 (Dukes Rebuttal) at 29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Decision No. 64172 (October 30, 2001) at 15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Ex. UNSE-24 (Dukes Rebuttal) at 14-15.

<sup>35</sup> Ex. UNSE-25 (Dukes Rejoinder) at 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Tr. (Moore) at 896.

#### 3. Rate Case Expense.

UNS Electric requests \$600,000 in rate case expenses – to be amortized over three years. This is only a portion of what UNS Electric will incur in litigating this rate case.<sup>37</sup> However, both Staff and RUCO argue that \$600,000 is unreasonable based solely on the rate case expense awarded for Southwest Gas Corporation in Decision No. 68487 (February 23, 2006). But, as set forth in UNS Electric's Initial Brief, there are material differences between Southwest Gas and UNS Electric that render the comparison worthless. Southwest Gas has accounting, legal, budgeting and other departments; UNS Electric does not.<sup>38</sup> Tucson Electric Power Company ("TEP") directly allocates costs to UNS Electric for service they actually use; Southwest Gas charges its Arizona operations indirectly whether those services are used or not.<sup>39</sup> Southwest Gas has internal personnel costs included in its base rates; UNS Electric does not.<sup>40</sup> Finally, UNS Electric does not have the resources Southwest Gas has and must rely on outside services from TEP and other vendors. RUCO witness Mr. Moore admits these key differences<sup>41</sup>, while Staff simply fails to acknowledge them.

Moreover, this rate case involved significant issues that were not addressed in the SWG rate case, including the Black Mountain Generating Station rate base treatment and the need for a new PPFAC. The Company also faced substantially more discovery as a result.

Staff's and RUCO's reliance on a rate case expense "benchmark" determined in another rate case that involved materially different circumstances is simply inappropriate. Rate case expense is an expense very particular to individual utilities. Courts understand that rate case expense is "highly specific to the particular utility and particular rate case in question" *City of Lancaster (Sewer Fund) v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n*, 793 A.2d 978, 982-84 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Further, rate expense may be influenced by factors such as whether a utility has an in-house legal staff, or is facing extensive amounts of discovery. *Id.* As long as actual rate case

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Ex. UNSE-24 (Dukes Rebuttal) at 17.

Ex. UNSE-24 (Dukes Rebuttal) at 16.
 Ex. UNSE-24 (Dukes Rebuttal) at 16.

<sup>40</sup> Ex. UNSE-24 (Dukes Rebuttal) at 16.

expenses are prudently-incurred, the Commission must allow recovery in rates. Columbus Telephone Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm'n, 75 P.3d 257 (Kan. 2003); Butler Township Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 473 A.2d 219, 221-22 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984); Maine Water Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 482 A.2d 443, 453 (Me. 1984). Because UNS Electric's rate case expenses are prudently incurred, the Commission must allow them in rates.

#### Call Center Expense.

RUCO attempts to challenge UNS Electric's Call Center by asserting a single - and misconstrued – statistic concerning customer complaints should be the sole factor in deciding whether call center consolidation was a cost-efficient measure. In fact, the previous system could not handle the call volume that UNS Electric faces as its customer base continues to grow.<sup>42</sup> UNS Electric needed increased staffing and personnel and expanded facilities regardless of whether it consolidated these operations with TEP.<sup>43</sup> UNS Electric's consolidation of its call center operations with UNS Gas and TEP was simply the most cost-effective solution – and comported with the increased efficiency through consolidation contemplated by the Commission in Decision No. 66028. Staff also has not challenged the Call Center Expense, and the Commission allowed similar Call Center expenses for UNS Gas. The Commission should allow recovery of this expense.

#### 5. Other Expenses.

Although RUCO challenges several smaller expenses, the Company substantiated the legitimacy of these expenses through the testimony of Thomas J. Ferry, UNS Electric's Vice President and General Manager. Mr. Ferry explained why the expenses at issue were directlyrelated to providing service to customers.<sup>44</sup> In contrast, RUCO provides no detail specifically meeting its burden to justify disallowing specific expenses. There is simply no basis to adopt RUCO's recommended disallowance for other expenses.

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Ex. UNSE-21 (Ferry Rebuttal) at 4-5.
 Ex. UNSE-21 (Ferry Rebuttal) at 4.
 Ex. UNSE-21 (Ferry Rebuttal) at 6-7.

## C. Cost of Capital

1. The Company's proposed Return on Equity accurately reflects the level of risk faced by UNS Electric.

UNS Electric requests a return on equity ("ROE") of 11.80 percent that reflects the specific circumstances of UNS Electric and its commensurate level of risk. Staff and RUCO continue to recommend ROEs of 10.00 percent and 9.30 percent respectively. These recommendations are 75 and 145 basis points below the 10.75% ROE that the Commission recently awarded to Arizona Public Service Company, a much larger investment-grade company with diversified generation resources. The evidence in this case is undisputed that APS is less risky than UNS Electric.

Although Staff infers that UNS Electric witness Mr. Kentton Grant did not use widely-accepted methodologies such as Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") and the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") as part of his determination, <sup>46</sup> the record is clear that Mr. Grant provided extensive analysis using both DCF and CAPM approaches. But Mr. Grant's analysis also reflects the actual circumstances of UNS Electric, something that neither Staff nor RUCO factored into their analyses. Looking at those circumstances, it is clear that UNS Electric is a relatively risky investment compared to APS or the comparable companies group. None of the companies in the comparable company group face the challenge of having to refinance all of their long-term debt while at the same time replacing their entire power supply portfolio. All of the distribution utility companies held by the comparable companies are larger in size and many have sizeable generation assets. All of those companies have investment-grade credit ratings. UNS Electric faces high growth that has adverse impacts on its financial integrity, amply shown through testimony, exhibits and analysis. Finally, UNS Electric does not provide a dividend payment. As a result, a 60 basis-point upward adjustment and an 11.80 percent return on equity is justified based the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> See Decision No. 69663 (June 28, 2007) at 49. (The Commission approved a 10.75 percent authorized ROE for APS.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> For instance, Staff states "UNSE is requesting a cost of equity of 11.8%. Staff, on the other hand, relied upon three well-accepted methodologies in arriving at a range for cost of equity between 9.5% and 10.5%, with a mid-point of 10.0%." See Staff's Post-Hearing Brief at 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Ex. UNSE-34 (Grant Direct) at 3-7; Ex. UNSE-35 (Grant Rebuttal) at 6, 23.

evidence concerning the circumstances facing the Company.

Although Staff points to Exhibit S-51 as evidence supporting its proposed ROE, that exhibit merely shows trends in authorized returns on equity without examining any other particulars of individual utilities. This case is not simply about trends, as Staff would like the Commission to assume.<sup>48</sup> In fact, many of the distribution companies were awarded ROEs in recent years either equal to or above what Staff and RUCO recommend here, despite UNS Electric's higher risk:

- Potomac Energy Power Company ("Pepco") 10.50 percent ROE without a bill stabilization adjustment in 2007. 49
- South Carolina Electric and Gas Company ("SCE&G") 12.25 percent ROE before
   a flotation adjustment of positive 20 basis points in 2003.<sup>50</sup>
- Nevada Power Company ("NPC") 10.70 percent ROE in 2007.<sup>51</sup>
- Puget Sound Energy, Inc. ("Puget") 10.40 percent ROE in 2007.<sup>52</sup> Puget serves more than 1 million energy customers and with diversified generation holdings, including company-controlled coal and hydroelectric resources.
- Arizona Public Service Company ("APS") 10.75 percent ROE in 2007.<sup>53</sup>

The Commission must look to the facts and evidence presented in this case, including considering the risks of the utility when determining an appropriate return. *Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Comm'n*, 193 A. 427, 435 (Pa.Super. 1937). Simply relying on trends ignores hard evidence of the Company's particular circumstances.

Even so, Exhibit S-51 indicates that the average ROE awarded in 2006 is 36 basis points above what Staff recommends and 106 basis points above what RUCO recommends. And ironically, Exhibit S-51 includes companies like Appalachian Power Company, Puget and NPC,

<sup>25 48</sup> See Staff's Post-Hearing Brief at 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> 2007 WL 2159658 (Md.P.S.C.) at 40-41.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> 2003 WL 1818431 (S.C.P.S.C.) at 35, 55.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> 2007 WL 2171450 (Nev.P.U.C.) at ¶ 120.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> 2007 WL 2184670 (Wash.U.T.Ć.) at 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Decision No. 69663 at 49.

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<sup>55</sup> Tr. (Parcell) at 1137. <sup>56</sup> Tr. (Parcell) at 1131-32, 1135.

<sup>57</sup> Ex. UNSE-35 (Grant Rebuttal) at 6. <sup>58</sup> Ex. UNSE-35 (Grant Rebuttal) at 20.

2007 WL 2171450 (Nev.P.C.) at ¶ 303.

who have CWIP included in their respective rate bases.<sup>54</sup> In effect, Exhibit S-51 reveals the unreasonableness of Staff's recommended ROE.

Staff has also mischaracterized the evidence when discussing return on equity. First, UniSource Energy Corporation ("UniSource Energy") does not guarantee debt for UNS Electric. UNS Electric has to assure lenders when it issues debt; and prospective lenders will look directly to the financials of UNS Electric, as Mr. Parcell admitted during the hearing.<sup>55</sup> UNS Electric's size will be a key factor to those lenders, as will its non-investment grade status. Further, equity investors will look to UNS Electric's financials to the extent it affects UniSource Energy.<sup>56</sup> Also, contrary to Staff's assertion, at page 21 of its Post-Hearing Brief, Mr. Grant did not make a 60basis-point adjustment simply due to UNS Electric's size or its non-investment grade status. UNS Electric also does not pay a common dividend.<sup>57</sup> Given the recent turmoil in the capital markets, these factors would support an even higher risk premium. UNS Electric's proposed ROE should be adopted because it reasonably reflects the true risk faced by the Company.

#### The Commission should adopt the Company's proposed capital 2. structure and cost of debt.

Staff acknowledges, at page 17 of its Post-Hearing Brief, that the Company's capital structure contains 48.85 percent equity as of June 30, 2007. The Company proposes a capital structure with 48.85 percent equity that reflects the actual capital structure going-forward. There is no argument that cost of capital is inherently forward-looking. There is no reason not to use the Company's actual capital structure - including 48.85 percent equity, 47.18 percent long-term debt. and 3.97 percent short-term debt.

The Company's proposed cost of long-term debt, 8.22 percent, also incorporates an amendment to UNS Electric's credit agreement in 2006.<sup>58</sup> It is undisputed that this is the

Compare Ex. S-51 at 4 to 2007 WL 1616129 (Va.S.C.C.) at 4, 2007 WL 184670 (Wash.U.T.C.) at 39,

Company's *actual* cost of long-term debt going forward. That rate should therefore be approved in this case.

#### D. Fair Value.

1. Staff's suggestion that RCND is not a good measure of fair value is meritless.

Even though Staff averages OCRB with RCND to determine its FVRB, Staff now suggests, at page 23 of its Post-Hearing Brief, that RCND may not be a good measure of determining fair value. However, Staff's position ignores the law and the evidence. Mr. Smith insinuated that using RCND to establish UNS Electric's FVRB could result in a substantial overstatement of FVRB. But Mr. Smith does not provide any analysis as to the particular circumstances that lead Citizens to sell those assets at that purchase price and what lead to the sale at that price. Further, the negative acquisition adjustments resulting for the amount UniSource Energy paid for the assets are already incorporated into the rate base for both the gas and electric assets. Ratepayers will continue to benefit from these negative acquisition adjustments. Further the Arizona Supreme Court indicated that a purchase price itself is not the relevant factor and could be the product of circumstances bearing no impact on fair value:

[The] Commission must consider all available evidence related to the fair value, and an inquiry into a recent purchase transaction might be of assistance, in the discretion of the Commission. But the reasons for that purchase price and not the amount itself would be of first importance in shedding light on the fair value of the property. Certain facts concerning the physical condition of the properties or what is actually used and useful, or the practical effects of particular business practices might thus be revealed more clearly. A purchase price which was the product of many considerations not relevant to fair value is, as a dollar figure, obviously not in itself indicative of the fair value of the properties sold.

Ariz. Corp. Comm'n v. Ariz. Water Company, 85 Ariz. 198, 203-04, 335 P.2d 412, 415 (1959). Therefore, the Commission should approve its traditional method averaging OCRB and RCND to determine FVRB, as the Parties all did in this docket.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Ex. S-56 at 9.

# 2. Staff's zero-investor-supplied capital theory ignores fair value and cannot be approved.

Although Staff argues, at page 23 of its Post-Hearing Brief, that the Company's position on fair value rate of return is meritless, basic arithmetic confirms that Staff's new "investor supplied capital theory" is equal to its old traditional methodology rejected by the Court of Appeals in *Chaparral City Water Company v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n*. In the remanded proceedings, Staff now abandons its traditional methodology for the new theory. But even Staff witness Mr. Parcell admits the new theory is equivalent to simply multiplying OCRB by COC. Thus, the "investor supplied capital" theory from Mr. Parcell and Mr. Smith ignores fair value, is unlawful, and cannot be approved by the Commission.

By way of further illustration, Staff's OCRB as stated in its final schedules equals \$130,740,050.<sup>62</sup> Multiplying that figure multiplied by Staff's 8.99 percent COC yields \$11,753,531, although Staff's figure is \$11,749,701. Using Staff's actual rate of return on FVRB produces a required operating income of \$11,762,085.<sup>63</sup> Thus, the difference between the two operating income calculations is approximately \$8,554 to \$12,384, or about a 0.0727252 to 0.1052875 percent difference, confirming Mr. Parcell's admission that the two formulae are mathematically the same – except perhaps for some nominal rounding difference. As a result, Staff's new theory still effectively ignores fair value and is prohibited under Arizona law.

## II. UNS ELECTRIC'S PROPOSED RATE DESIGN IS REASONABLE.

UNS Electric continues to support its progressive rate design proposals to support and encourage conservation, including mandatory time-of-use ("TOU") rates and the inclining block

<sup>60</sup> See Ralph C. Smith and David C. Parcell Direct Testimonies in Docket No. W-02113A-04-0616 (August

<sup>24 30, 2007).</sup>Tr. (Parcell) at 1187-88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> See Staff's Notice of Filing Final Schedules (October 16, 2007) at Schedule A.

Staff's Notice of Filing Final Schedules at Schedule A. RUCO proposes a required operating income using its method to determine ROR on FVRB that is exactly equal to taking its OCRB and multiplying that figure by its COC – \$11,171,471. See RUCO's Notice of Filing Final Schedules (October 17, 2007) at Schedule FINAL RLM-1. RUCO's method also ignores fair value and is unlawful. RUCO does not address this issue in its Closing Brief, except to recommend an 8.67 ROR on its FVRB determination.

rate structure. The Company's rate design proposals are in the best interests of the Company's 1 2 3 4 5

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<sup>64</sup> Ex. UNSE-18 (Erdwurm Rebuttal) at 12-13; Tr. (Erdwurm) at 472-74.

<sup>65</sup> Ex UNSE-18 (Erdwurm Rebuttal) at 12-13.

<sup>66</sup> Ex. UNSE-17 (Erdwurm Direct) at 18. <sup>67</sup> Tr. (Erdwurm) at 472-74.

<sup>68</sup> Tr. (Erdwurm) at 475.

# and its Customers and are in the Public Interest.

Only Staff does not support mandatory TOU rates in this case. Staff witness Mr. Frank Radigan argues against the implementation of mandatory TOU rates based only upon the cost differential between TOU and non-TOU meters. But Staff's position ignores the long-term benefits of shifting load from peak times.<sup>64</sup> Further, Mr. D. Bentley Erdwurm testified that UNS Electric is already moving toward smart metering, with TOU capabilities. As the Company implements its plan to install TOU-capable, communication-capable meters, the cost differential to which Mr. Radigan refers will disappear.<sup>65</sup> In addition, the Company's proposal takes into account that putting all customers on mandatory TOU is costly over the short-term – due to the meters needed. 66 UNS Electric's proposal is a gradual yet significant step towards moving all customers to TOU rates. This is through mandating TOU for all new and moving residential customers, small general service customers, large general service customers with maximum demand less than 1,000 kW, as well as for all large general service customers with maximum demand equal to or greater than 1,000 kW and all Large Light and Power customers.

Further, for TOU rates to be truly effective in shaving peak load, all customers must be asked to bear their fair share of responsibility and pay the actual costs of power they use.<sup>67</sup> Customers must notice the impact of using power at peak times and act accordingly to lower their bills. 68 Mandatory participation is needed to truly advance conservation goals. The Company

already has a TOU education program to encourage customers to shift use.<sup>69</sup> RUCO understands that mandatory TOU will allow the Company to "further shave peak load, while at the same time [provide] an incentive for customers to shift load and save money."<sup>70</sup>

Finally, support of mandatory TOU rates would be consistent with an approach of developing conservation, demand-side management and renewables issues over a longer time period. Mr. Erdwurm cites the Commission's new Renewable Energy Standard ("RES") Rules in Decision No. 69127 (November 14, 2006) as "a classic example" of it supporting an environmentally friendly program with a long-term outlook.<sup>71</sup> In both cases, programs that may not be economically viable given today's cost structure are encouraged in anticipation of future efficiency and technology improvements, as well as net cost reductions that will come with increased use.

The evidence - and good public policy - support mandatory TOU rates in this case. Therefore, they should be implemented as a key means to support conservation, lower average energy costs through shaving from peak load, and being in the public interest.

#### This is the Appropriate Time to Implement Inclining/Inverted Block Rate В. Structure in this Rate Case.

While Staff supports the concept of the inclining block rate structure, Mr. Radigan is concerned that the requested rate increase is too small to implement such a change now, and that the new rate design will be confusing for customers. However, Staff has supported inverted block rate designs in a number of cases because it believed it advanced the goal of supporting conservation.<sup>72</sup> Now, Staff through Mr. Radigan recommends that the inverted block rate design not be implemented in this case.

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<sup>69</sup> Tr. (D. Smith) at 626-27.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Ex. RUCO-9 (Diaz Cortez Direct) at 4.

Ex. UNSE-18 (Erdwurm Rebuttal) at 13-14. See Decision Nos. 67093 (June 30, 2004 - Arizona American Water Company), 68858 (July 28, 2006 -Arizona American Water Company Paradise Valley Water District), 68302 (November 14, 2005 -Arizona Water Company's Western Group).

UNS Electric continues to support the immediate implementation of its proposed inclining block rate structure. This is precisely the time to implement such a rate design change, when the requested rate increase is relatively small. Further, Mr. Radigan acknowledged at the rate case hearing that the customer confusion about which he is concerned may be alleviated through the Company's customer education efforts.<sup>73</sup> The bottom line is that tiered inverted block rates send a strong price signal to conserve because of the higher rate per kWh beyond each breakover point.<sup>74</sup> Simply put, there is no good reason to delay approval of an inverted block rate design in this proceeding as the Company proposes.

# C. The Rates for Mohave and Santa Cruz Counties should be Consolidated in this Proceeding.

Staff's argument that the rate increase is too small to justify consolidation is unwarranted. The evidence is undisputed that UNS Electric is running its Mohave County and its Santa Cruz County operations as one system.<sup>75</sup> Because its operations are combined, having higher rates for Santa Cruz County customers than for Mohave County customers is inequitable.<sup>76</sup> The inequity can and should be addressed here, particularly given the relatively small overall base rate increase UNS Electric is seeking.<sup>77</sup>

# D. UNS Electric's Demand Charge Proposal for Large Service Customers is Reasonable.

UNS Electric understands Staff's concerns with reducing the demand charge differential for Large Service Customers (those customers taking power at 69 kV and above) and those for whom power has been stepped down. As Mr. Erdwurm indicated during the hearing, it will be beneficial to perform a study for the next general rate case, such that a true cost-based differential may be determined.<sup>78</sup> However, the Company's approach is one of common sense. Specifically,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Tr. (Radigan) at 1267.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Ex. UNSE-18 (Erdwurm Rebuttal) at 9-10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Tr. (Erdwurm) at 460; Tr. (Ferry) at 485.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Ex. UNSE-18 (Erdwurm) at 15; Tr. (Erdwurm) at 460.

<sup>27 | 77</sup> Tr. (Erdwurm) at 460-63.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Tr. (Erdwurm) at 469.

when a demand charge differential greatly exceeds the bounds of what typically occurs - and this may be determined without conducting a study - then any immediate reduction in the demand charge differential helps ensure that lower load factor customers do not overpay for energy. This has economic development implications; hence some reduction in the demand charge differential is in the public interest.

#### The Purchased Power Allocation should be based in Part Upon Average and E. Peaks, and in Part Upon Energy.

In its Post-Hearing Brief, Staff misstates the Company's position on the purchased power allocation. While Mr. Erdwurm did originally propose allocating all purchased power using the Average and Peaks Method, he then proposed a purchased power allocation of 50 percent each for capacity and energy – using the average and peaks method for the capacity portion.<sup>79</sup> But given that UNS Electric likely has a lower system load factor than TEP – and TEP uses a purchased power allocation with a 50/50 split between capacity and energy – a lower capacity allocation of 40 percent versus a 60 percent energy allocation makes sense for UNS Electric. 80 The Company, therefore, proposes using a purchased power allocation of 40 percent capacity and 60 percent energy for the next rate case.

Further, Mr. Erdwurm explained why Mr. Radigan's 100-percent energy allocation is flawed. The 100-percent energy allocation does not recognize that wholesale energy purchase prices are affected by both the level of the energy sale and the load factor.<sup>81</sup> Based upon the economic concept that fixed costs per unit decline as volume increases, low load factor customers are more costly to serve, other things being constant. The fact that the current contract with Pinnacle West, for simplicity, used a volumetric pricing structure implies nothing to contradict Mr. Erdwurm's position. In fact, the average price of purchased power for UNS Electric was influenced by load factor and Pinnacle West took into account the load characteristics when the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Ex. UNSE-18 (Erdwurm Rebuttal) at 6-7. Ex. UNSE-18 (Erdwurm Rebuttal) at 7.

<sup>81</sup> Ex. UNSE-18 (Erdwurm Rebuttal) at 6-7.

contract was entered with then-Citizen's Arizona Electric Division.<sup>82</sup> The influence of load factor will become more pronounced once the Pinnacle West contract expires.<sup>83</sup> Using a purchased power allocation of 100-percent energy ignores the realities of the marketplace.

#### UNS ELECTRIC'S CARES DISCOUNT BENEFITS LOW-INCOME CUSTOMERS III. WHILE PROMOTING CONSERVATION.

While RUCO supports the Company's CARES and CARES-Medical discount proposals, Staff does not. Staff advocates for the retention of the current CARES and CARES-Medical discounts, which provide declining percentage discounts for participating customers, with a flat \$8,00 discount for usage over a 1,000 kWh threshold for CARES customers, and a 2,000 kWh threshold for CARES-Medical customers.

Because the other parties did not speak to low-income issues in their initial briefs, the Company simply reiterates its belief that its proposed CARES discount, and its requests related to other low-income customer issues, are all supported in the record in this case, as set forth in its Initial Post-Hearing Brief.

#### IV. DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT ("DSM") COST RECOVERY.

The Company agrees to establish a DSM adjustor mechanism, and to set the initial rate at \$0.000583 per kWh. This represents funding 100 percent of the expanded low-income weatherization ("LIW") program costs and 25 percent of all other proposed DSM program costs through the DSM adjustor mechanism.<sup>84</sup> The Company, Staff and RUCO appear to agree on this point.

Mr. Magruder proposes that one date be used for the annual adjustments of the DSM, RES and PPFAC rate adjustors. Currently, the DSM adjustor is scheduled for implementation on June 1<sup>st</sup> of each year, although Mr. Magruder mistakenly references a January implementation date. As Staff witness Mr. Jerry Anderson stated in his Direct Testimony, "Staff recommends that UNS Electric's DSM adjustor rate be reset annually on June 1 of each year beginning June 1, 2009; and

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Ex. UNSE-18 (Erdwurm Rebuttal) at 8.
 Ex. UNSE-19 (Erdwurm Rejoinder) at 3-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Ex. UNSE-6 (Pignatelli Rebuttal) at 15; Ex. S-63 (Anderson Direct) at 15-16.

that the per kWh rate be based upon currently projected DSM costs for that year, adjusted by the previous year's over- or under- collection, divided by projected retail sales (kWh) for that same year."

The Company agrees with Staff's comments and recommendations. Annual adjustments for charges related to the RES depend on approval of the Company's RES Tariff and Implementation Plan, described below.

Mr. Magruder makes an abundance of recommendations concerning DSM – most of which the Company opposes. Even so, the Company understands that Staff continues to evaluate the Company's comprehensive DSM Program Portfolio Plan in Docket No. E-04204-07-0365. That filing is incorporated by reference in this case as the Company's DSM proposal. UNS Electric recommends implementation of the DSM Program Portfolio Plan it filed in Docket No. E-04204A-06-0365 on June 13, 2007 (the "DSM Docket").

# V. UNS ELECTRIC'S PROPOSED CHANGES TO ITS RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE REASONABLE.

# A. The Company's Proposed Billing Terms are More Lenient than Commission Rules Allow.

The Company understands that the Commission's rules differ between gas utilities and electric utilities. The fact remains that – to match UNS Electric billing terms to UNS Gas billing terms – UNS Electric proposes billing terms that allow for 25 total days before a bill becomes delinquent. That is *more* lenient than A.A.C. R14-2-210.C. The Company's proposal regarding billing terms is fair and equitable to customers and unifies billing terms for customers served by both UNS Gas and UNS Electric.

# B. Staff Misconstrues the Company's Proposal Regarding Line Extensions and Free Footage.

Exhibits UNSE-54, UNSE-55 and UNSE-56 make it clear that the Company's proposal is to *eliminate* 50 feet and one carryover pole from its overhead service line connection.<sup>88</sup> Further,

<sup>85</sup> Ex. S-63 (Anderson Direct) at 14.

<sup>86</sup> Ex. UNSÈ-28 (D. Smith Rebuttal) at 21.

Ex. UNSE-21 (Ferry Rebuttal) at 2.
 See Ex. UNSE-21 (Ferry Rebuttal) at 9.

the Company does not contend that A.A.C. R14-2-207 requires a free footage allowance; rather, the Company is concerned that Staff's proposal proposes a major shift in policy that will likely have adverse impacts on economic development efforts in places like Kingman, Lake Havasu City and Nogales.<sup>89</sup> It is also important to note that the Company did propose a Service Connection Fee of \$250 for each new electric service connection.<sup>90</sup> The Company believes that its two proposals represent a better balancing of all interests than simply eliminating free footage as urged by Staff.

## C. Mr. Magruder's Recommendations.

Mr. Magruder makes several recommendations regarding UNS Electric's Rules. These recommendations include that the Rules be: (1) rewritten in "plain" language; (2) provided to each customer; (3) translated into Spanish; and (4) reformatted. UNS Electric's proposed Rules are in compliance with the A.A.C. and UNS Electric recommends implementation of the proposed Rules as soon as possible. In fact, much of the language in the Company's Rules comes directly from the Commission's Rules and is organized very similarly to the Commission's Rules. The Company already provides copies of applicable rules for new customers requiring line extensions. Providing a copy of the rules to all customers – especially when they are available online – is extremely costly to the ratepayer. Finally, UNS Electric has no objection to translating the rules and regulations into Spanish and making that version available online.

## VI. PURCHASED POWER AND FUEL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE ("PPFAC").

The Company and Staff largely agree on the general structure to the PPFAC and the Company will not repeat those details here.<sup>91</sup> Two areas of disagreement clearly remain: (1) permitting other allowable costs through the PPFAC; and (2) Staff's last-minute proposal for a cap on the PPFAC.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ex. UNSE-21 (Ferry Rebuttal) at 9-10. Based on the language of A.A.C. R14-2-207.C., it does not appear that a free footage allowance is required per se. Still allowing a set amount of free footage had been widely practiced amongst electric utilities in Arizona.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>0</sup> Ex. UNSE-46

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> See UNS Electric's Initial Post-Hearing Brief at 66-68 for discussion on the PPFAC.

First, Staff does not refute that UNS Electric does not have procurement, scheduling and management costs in base rates because of the full requirements purchased power contract with Pinnacle West Capital Corporation ("Pinnacle West"). Page 20 RUCO admits these costs are not reflected in test-year expenses, but the Company will incur these costs as it replaces the Pinnacle West contract. Further, because the costs are likely to vary year-to-year and are an inevitable part of procuring fuel and purchased power, it makes more senses to recover those costs through the PPFAC. In the alternative, the Company requests the Commission approve forecasted procurement, scheduling and management fees set forth in Exhibit MJD-6 to Mr. DeConcini's Rejoinder Testimony.

Second, regarding a cap on the PPFAC, Staff states only, at page 41 of its Post-Hearing Brief, that "due to late-filed information by the Company regarding prospective gas prices, Staff is also recommending a cap on the PPFAC in order to prevent rate shock." Although Staff provides absolutely no further analysis of the rate cap, Staff witness Mr. Smith has acknowledged that caps can lead to large deferrals that can negatively impact the Company, by making it a riskier investment. <sup>96</sup> UNS Electric's customers will have to pay for those cost deferrals eventually. <sup>97</sup> Mr. Smith also admits that it would not be appropriate to force a cap on the PPFAC in this period of flux for UNS Electric and that a cap could improperly encourage short-term rate stability at the expense of serving the long-term interests of customers. <sup>98</sup> The Company would have to finance any deferral. If the deferrals become large, it is unclear whether Company's revolving credit facility can cover those costs being deferred; this leads to further uncertainty over financing and the costs of financing. <sup>99</sup>

Ex. UNSE-15 (DeConcini Rebuttal) at 15; Ex. UNSE-16 (DeConcini Rejoinder) at 3; Tr. (DeConcini) at 339-40, 341-42.

<sup>93</sup> Tr. (Diaz Cortez) at 1275, 1281-83.

<sup>25 || 94</sup> Tr. (R. Smith) at 1226.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> Ex. UNSE-16 (DeConcini Rejoinder) at 3-4, Ex. MJD-6; Tr. (DeConcini) at 337-38, 345.

<sup>26</sup> Ex. S-58 (Smith Surrebuttal) at 54.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Ex. S-58 (Smith Surrebuttal) at 54.

<sup>98</sup> Ex. S-58 (Smith Surrebuttal) at 54.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Tr. (Grant) at 1411-12.

Staff confusingly suggests (or may suggest) at pages 40-41 of its Post-Hearing Brief, that capacity costs should be covered through base rates, not through the PPFAC, citing the Direct Testimony of Staff witness Ralph Smith. However, that testimony was a general discussion of PPFACs and is inconsistent with both Mr. Smith's Surrebuttal Testimony as well as the PPFAC and Plan of Administration ("POA") actually proposed by Mr. Smith. To begin with, the PPFAC adopted by the Commission for APS (the "Power Supply Adjustor") – and proposed by Staff in this docket – does include recovery of capacity cost. Moreover, the redlined POA in Mr. Smith's Surrebuttal Testimony provides for recovery for costs in FERC Account Nos. 555 (Purchased Power) and 565 (Wheeling (Transmission of Electricity by Others)). Those FERC accounts expressly include capacity costs. Nowhere in Mr. Smith's Surrebuttal, nor in the POA, are capacity costs excluded from recovery through the PPFAC.

Mr. Smith's Surrebuttal Testimony provides ample reason why capacity costs should be recovered through UNS Electric's PPFAC. First, when the Pinnacle West contract expires, the Company's fuel and purchased power costs may be significantly different than they have been while the Pinnacle West contract was in effect. UNS Electric will not have the same degree of control over its fuel and purchased power costs upon expiration of the Pinnacle West contract and it would be unrealistic to expect that UNS Electric would be able to keep its costs close to those under the Pinnacle West contract. Second, Mr. Smith states that UNS Electric will not receive any return on its prudently incurred fuel and purchased power costs and that he believes the Company should be allowed to recover through the PPFAC the costs included in FERC accounts 501, 547, 555 and 565 as well as the prudent direct cost of contracts used for hedging system fuel and purchased power costs. In defining the parameters of costs to be recovered under the PPFAC, Mr. Smith only took exception to the category of "other includible costs" and certainly

<sup>100</sup> Compare Staff's Post-Hearing Brief at 40-41 to Ex. S-58 (R. Smith Surrebuttal) at Ex. RCS-7 at 12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> See Staff's Notice of Filing: Revised Plan of Administration in Docket No. E-01345A-05-0816 (July 30, 2007) at Page 11.

<sup>26 | 102</sup> Ex. S-58 (R. Smith Surrebuttal) at Ex. RCS-7 at 12.

Ex. S-58 (R. Smith Surrebuttal) at 49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Ex. S-58 (R. Smith Surrebuttal) at 49-50.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Ex. S-58 (R. Smith Surrebuttal) at 55-57, 63.

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26 27 not capacity costs under the specified FERC accounts. 106 Indeed, Mr. Smith expressly notes that a well-designed PPFAC would avoid situations where delayed recovery of prudent and reasonable fuel and energy costs would have material financial consequences on a company; thus, allowing reasonably prompt recovery of prudent fuel and energy costs. 107 Yet, now Staff may be suggesting that UNS Electric be prevented from recovering the prudent capacity costs of its new power supply through the PPFAC. That new position should be rejected.

In fact, allowing recovery of capacity costs through the PPFAC makes particularly good sense here. UNS Electric has no historic level of purchased capacity costs that could be included in base rates because of the Pinnacle West contract and as Staff has acknowledged, the Company's power supply portfolio will be completely different as of June 1, 2008. If capacity costs are not allowed to be recovered through the PPFAC, it would simply preclude UNS Electric from any recovery of those costs because the base rates do not reflect capacity costs related to the new power supply portfolio. That circumstance would create an incentive to have capacity costs included in energy costs (which may result in increased costs). In sum, capacity costs are directly related to purchased power and transmission, are included in FERC Account Nos. 555 and 565, and should be recovered.

Finally, RUCO continues to press, at pages 3-4 of its Closing Brief, for its PPFAC involving a historical twelve-month rolling average mechanism as its proposal. Both Staff and the Company believe RUCO's proposal should be rejected and the Company stands by its Initial Brief regarding RUCO's proposal.

The Company believes the PPFAC as put forth in its Rebuttal Testimony and detail in its POA is the best means to promptly recover fuel and purchased power. The Company further agrees with Staff's proposed changes – as provided in Staff's redlined POA in its Surrebuttal Testimony – with the exception of its position on other allowable costs and a cap.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> Ex. S-58 (R. Smith Surrebuttal) at 63 and Ex. RCS-7 thereto at 12 <sup>107</sup> Ex. S-58 (R. Smith Surrebuttal) at 60-61.

#### VII. **BLACK MOUNTAIN GENERATION STATION ("BMGS").**

UNS Electric understands that it is requesting unusual rate base treatment for BMGS. However, the unique facts and circumstances, as well as the benefits of BMGS to both the Company and its customers, justify the rate base and rate reclassification treatment sought by UNS To be clear, the requested treatment of BMGS is conditioned upon UNS Electric acquiring BMGS. Although UNS Electric does not own BMGS now, if the Commission approves the Company's request, then the Company will acquire BMGS at cost. The rate base adjustment will be a fixed, known and measurable amount of \$60 million and the adjustment will take place on June 1, 2008 or the date on which BMGS is operational, whichever is later. At the date BMGS is put into rate base, the Company will institute a revenue-neutral rate reclassification – increasing the base delivery charge by 0.6 cents per kWh while simultaneously decreasing the base power supply charge by 0.6 cents per kWh. UNS Electric is not requesting that the prudency of the construction cost of BMGS be decided in this docket. That will take place in the next rate case. UNS Electric also will not seek to recover any BMGS costs in excess of \$60 million until the next rate case.

The Company will be unable to acquire BMGS if the Commission does not grant the Company's proposed treatment of BMGS. Without that approval, the Company cannot finance the acquisition of BMGS. 108 The cost of BMGS, which is \$60 to \$65 million, represents no less than 42.5 percent of the Company's OCRB figure – and a higher percentage per Staff's OCRB figure. The rate reclassification adds \$10 million in non-fuel revenue requirement – resulting in an additional \$3 million in net income and \$6 million in operating cash flow needed to service the additional capital raised. 109 An accounting order or other deferral will not add the cash flows needed to finance the acquisition. 110 And a purchased power contract between UniSource Energy Development Company ("UEDC") and UNS Electric will not provide long-term benefits to UNS

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Ex. UNSE-8 (Larson Direct) at 6-8.
 Ex. UNSE-8 (Larson Direct) at 10, Ex. KPL-2; Ex. UNSE-9 (Larson Rebuttal) at 8, 11.
 Ex. UNSE-9 (Larson Rebuttal) at 6.

Electric and its customers. 111

Ironically, Staff appears to agree that acquisition of BMGS is beneficial to the Company and its customers. It also has recommended approval of financing of up to \$40 million in new debt and \$40 in additional equity infusion to allow the acquisition. However, Staff has balked at taking the final step necessary to allow UNS Electric to acquire BMGS in a cost effective manner that is in the public interest.

# A. The Evidence is Undisputed that UNS Electric Acquiring BMGS Provides Numerous and Substantial Benefits to the Company and its Customers.

The operational and financial benefits of BMGS remain unrefuted. UNS Electric ownership will save ratepayers millions over the 30-to-40-year life of the asset versus purchased power. And, if the purchased power demand charge were to be higher than \$7 per month per kW, then the savings would be more pronounced due to the cumulative impacts of ADIT and depreciation expense that reduce the Company's revenue requirement for owned generating capacity. Moreover, the Company avoids having to pay escalators commonly-associated with PPAs that often increase over time. Further, improved cash flow from BMGS provides additional funding for UNS Electric's ongoing construction program, improves its credit profile, and allows the Company to attract financing on more reasonable terms.

The operational benefits – including full operational flexibility, full control over maintenance and operation, having in-house generation to exactly meet peak capacity and reserve needs, and having generation at a location that minimizes transmission costs – are all undisputed. In fact, Staff's engineering personnel involved in this case recognized the substantial benefits BMGS would provide. The 90 MW facility would significantly improve and diversify UNS Electric's power portfolio, especially given the need to procure 450 MW of generating capacity

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> Ex. UNSE-9 (Larson Rebuttal) at 13.

<sup>112</sup> Ex. UNSE-8 (Larson Direct) at 14, Ex. KPL-3.

<sup>26 | 113</sup> Ex. UNSE-8 (Larson Direct) at 13.

<sup>114</sup> Ex. UNSE-14 (DeConcini Rebuttal) at 4.

<sup>115</sup> Ex. UNSE-9 (Larson Rebuttal) at 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Ex. UNSE-52

due to the Pinnacle West contract expiring on May 31, 2008. 117

## B. Staff and RUCO's Arguments against Rate-Basing BMGS are Unfounded.

Rather than challenge the financial and operational benefits of BMGS and the unique circumstances facing UNS Electric, Staff and RUCO assert general ratemaking principles as somehow justifying their arguments against the Company's proposal.

First, Staff's concern that UNS Electric does not own BMGS is perplexing. The purpose of the proposed rate base treatment is to allow the Company to acquire BMGS and rate base the asset close to the time the Pinnacle West contract expires. UNS Electric *will* own BMGS if the Commission approves its request. The Company's witnesses have testified numerous times that UEDC *will* sell BMGS *at cost* to UNS Electric.<sup>118</sup> Only if the Commission rejects UNS Electric's proposal will other opportunities be pursued.<sup>119</sup>

Second, contrary to Staff's belief, the BMGS proposal is not CWIP. Indeed, UNS Electric has no CWIP or AFUDC related to BMGS because it is not building BMGS. BMGS will not enter rate base until it is acquired by UNS Electric and is fully operational.

Third, UNS Electric does not dispute Staff's statement that BMGS was not used and useful during the test year. But that is not the issue. BMGS is a generation asset that will partially replace the Pinnacle West contract upon its expiration. The in-service date is projected to be May 1, 2008. The rate reclassification will not occur until *after* BMGS is in commercial operation or June 1, 2008 (the date the Pinnacle West contract expires), whichever is later. Even so, the Company will file its completion report to confirm the plant is in service, used and useful and serving existing customers. The plant will be used and useful and serving *existing* customers when the post-test-year adjustment takes effect.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> Ex. UNSE-15 (DeConcini Rebuttal) at 3.

<sup>118</sup> Ex. UNSE-9 (Larson Rebuttal) at 12; Ex. UNSE-15 (DeConcini Rebuttal) at 4; Tr. (Larson) at 193-94; Tr. (DeConcini) at 309.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Tr. (Larson) at 195; Tr. (DeConcini) at 305-07.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> Tr. (DeConcini) at 308-09.

<sup>121</sup> Ex. UNSE-8 (Larson Direct) at 4; Ex. UNSE-9 (Larson Rebuttal) at 12.

Fourth, contrary to Staff's assertion, the rate base adjustment is known and measurable. UNS Electric is requesting a set amount – \$60 million – to be added to rate base reflecting the addition of BMGS. This is a known and measurable amount representing the \$46 million fixedprice turnkey construction contract plus \$14 million in additional costs. 122 If the additional costs exceed \$14 million – and those costs could be between \$14 million and \$19 million – any additional amount above \$60 million is not part of the Company's proposal in this proceeding. Further, any so-called "cost overruns" will not be recovered until the next UNS Electric rate case is adjudicated when parties will be allowed to fully examine the prudence of the BMGS construction costs. Finally, the \$60 million reflects only the cost of the plant – \$60 million will be added to rate base and a revenue neutral rate reclassification will occur.

Fifth, Staff's concern that UNS Electric is not building BMGS is neither probative nor material to whether rate-basing BMGS is in the public interest. In fact, UNS Electric avoids the risks associated with building BMGS; UEDC incurs that risk. 123 Further, Staff's assertion that there is no construction taking place is false. Mr. Larson testified that construction is underway. 124 And regardless of the Commission's decision in this case, the BMGS construction will continue and is scheduled to be completed May 1, 2008. Because BMGS was intended to partially replace the full requirements contract with Pinnacle West that expires on May 31, 2008, it made no sense to plan construction to be completed before May 2008.

Finally, with respect to Staff's concerns over the ultimate prudency of acquiring BMGS, the Company understands and accepts that the Commission reserves its right to determine the prudence of BMGS construction costs in the next UNS Electric rate case. 126 The Commission could disallow costs and order a refund and has reserved that right in reviewing fuel and purchased power costs passed through adjustor mechanisms, for example. But it is the Company that bears the risk. Further, even Staff witness Mr. Smith acknowledges that BMGS represents a good

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<sup>122</sup> Ex. UNSE-8 (Larson Direct) at 4; Tr. (Larson) at 207; Tr. (DeConcini) at 309-10.

<sup>123</sup> Tr. (Larson) at 214.

<sup>124</sup> Tr. (Larson) at 220.
125 Tr. (DeConcini) at 305, 308-09, 383.
126 Ex. UNSE-9 (Larson Rebuttal) at 12; Tr. (Larson) at 167.

opportunity for UNS Electric.<sup>127</sup> Exhibit UNSE-43 shows that UNS Electric acquiring BMGS will not harm customers compared to purchasing power in the short term; and may even save customers from additional transmission costs and ancillary service costs.<sup>128</sup> Delay will only increase the cost of acquiring BMGS – if the Company could even afford to do so in the future – and will interfere with a golden opportunity to develop a diverse power supply portfolio at the time the Pinnacle West contract expires.

RUCO opposes BMGS by setting forth a list of general regulatory principles that may be contrary to the proposed treatment of BMGS. Although the treatment of BMGS is unusual, it is not prohibited by law. Further, the Company's specific proposal and the benefits of BMGS either refute or ameliorate RUCO's general regulatory concerns, as explained in detail in Mr. Larson's Rebuttal Testimony:

Known and measurable principal.

The costs of BMGS will be known prior to the rate reclassification. As stated above, the Company's proposed adjustment to rate base reflects the minimum cost estimate of \$60 million; we are proposing a known and reasonably measurable – and minimal – cost. As of June 30, 2007, approximately \$33 million had been spent on BMGS. Even if actual project costs exceed this amount, UNS Electric is not seeking rate base treatment for any additional amount in this case; it will wait until the Company's next general rate case. Following the purchase of the project by UNS Electric, and upon commercial operation of the facility, the Company will provide the Commission with a project completion report detailing the cost of completion and the results of pre-commercial testing. Thirty days after this report has been filed, or on June 1, 2008 if the project is completed prior to May 1, 2008, the Company would then implement the rate reclassification described above. The Company is not proposing that the post-test-year adjustment of BMGS take effect until after the facility is providing electricity to UNS Electric's customers (i.e. used and useful.) Further, no one disputes that the plant is going to serve existing customers as of June 1, 2008 because that is when the PWCC purchased power contract expires. In addition, the Commission still has the authority to review of construction costs to ensure they are prudent in the next rate case.

Matching principal.

The Company's rate reclassification proposal is designed to *exactly* match the timing of rate recovery with purchased power cost avoidance. The effect of this post-test-year adjustment is to add approximately \$10 million to the Company's non-fuel revenue requirement, assuming a \$60 million project completion cost. On the effective date of this adjustment, UNS Electric would increase the average base delivery charge to customers by approximately 0.6 cents per kWh, *and* make a corresponding decrease of 0.6 cents per kWh to the base power supply rate. If

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> Tr. (R. Smith) at 1237-38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> Tr. (Grant) at 965.

UNS Electric acquires BMGS, it can reduce the base power supply rate because the Company will (1) avoid buying up to 90 MW of wholesale market capacity; (2) have a large portion of required ancillary services; and (3) have a significant volume of wholesale transmission wheeling due to BMGS' location. Again, the plant would serve existing customers, particularly given the expiration of the PWCC contract at the end of May 2008; BMGS is not a "revenue enhancer" to simply address future growth as RUCO seems to suggest without any support. So, this is a case where abiding by RUCO's strict interpretation of the matching principle would mean the Company and its customers would miss out on the opportunity to obtain both financial and operational benefits from rate basing BMGS.

Historical test year principal.

The PWCC contract, which currently supplies nearly all of UNS Electric's energy requirements, did not expire during the test year. The PWCC contract expires on May 31, 2008 and UNS Electric must begin procuring energy or generation now to supply nearly all of its customers' energy demand beginning June 1, 2008. UNS Electric does not have the luxury of waiting until 2010 for non-fuel cost recovery for an asset that would increase the Company's test-year OCRB by 43% and requires financing that would increase the Company's test year capitalization by approximately 50%. The Commission's regulations allow for pro forma adjustments when appropriate. The Company believes that such an adjustment is appropriate in this situation.

Used and useful principal.

Upon receipt of the completion report of BMGS, the Commission will confirm that the asset is used and useful. No one disputes that the plant will serve *existing* customers once in commercial operation, starting June 1, 2008. The proposed rate reclassification will not occur until the Commission reviews this report.

Related party transaction.

UNS Electric has committed to acquiring BMGS at *cost* from UEDC. UNS Electric is open to a full a prudence review of those costs in the next rate case.

Pre-determination of prudency.

The only "pre-determination" being sought by UNS Electric is that the acquisition of BMGS is in the public interest. The financial and operating benefits are summarized in this testimony and are fully addressed in my Direct Testimony and in Mr. DeConcini's Direct Testimony. The Commission maintains its authority to review construction costs in its next rate case. 129

The bottom line is that UNS Electric will own BMGS if the Commission approves: (1) its proposal to rate base BMGS at \$60 million; (2) its proposed rate reclassification that will add \$10 million to the non-fuel revenue requirement per year — moving 0.6 cents per kWh from the base power supply charge to the base delivery charge; and (3) the requested financing authority for BMGS. That ownership will provide numerous operational and financial benefits to UNS Electric over the long-term as the uncontroverted evidence in the record shows.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>129</sup> UNSE-9 (Larson Rebuttal) at 10-12.

### VIII. RENEWABLE ENERGY STANDARD/ENVIRONMENTAL PORTFOLIO STANDARD ISSUES.

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The Company filed its Application for Approval of UNS Electric's RES Implementation Plan and Associated Tariff on October 12, 2007. See Docket No. E-04204-07-0593. That application requests clarification that – upon approval of its application – UNS Electric be released from any and all obligations under A.A.C. R14-2-1618 that is the Environmental Portfolio Standard ("EPS"). That application also sought clarification on how to use EPS funds and whether those funds can be used toward RES program expenses. The Company maintains that issues involving the EPS and REST, including its Environmentally Friendly Portfolio Surcharge ("EFPS") are better addressed in UNS Electric's RES Tariff docket. Staff appears to agree. 130 Further, the Company will be required to file annual Compliance Reports (every April 1st) and Implementation Plans (every July 1<sup>st</sup>). A.A.C. R14-2-1812 and -1813. It is expected that the Company's RES Tariff Docket will also determine the effective date and reset date for the RES adjustor charge.

#### OTHER ISSUES. IX.

#### A. Life-Support Notification.

Mr. Magruder has asserted that for customers who utilize life-support equipment in their homes, the Company should be responsible for providing the names and addresses of those customers to emergency response agencies. The Company is not in favor of sharing customerspecific information with third parties. Even if the Company could share such information, the Company cannot reliably track where these specific customers are located on the system. 131 Instead, the Company utilizes its outage status recordings to inform all customers regarding the status of system outages, thereby allowing customers to make informed decisions regarding their unique, specific needs. But the Company cannot know whether every specific customer has sufficient backup supply for a 1-hour versus a 4-hour outage. As Mr. Pignatelli stated during the

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See S-63 (Anderson Direct) at 19-20.Ex. UNSE-22 (Ferry Rejoinder) at 6.

hearing, UNS Electric is happy to work with the appropriate agencies on this very important issue. 132

#### В. Citizens' Obligations and Projects.

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As suggested by Judge Wolfe during the hearing, UNS Electric contacted Mr. Magruder and scheduled a meeting to discuss his concerns regarding the Citizens Settlement Agreement and certain reliability issues. UNS Electric Vice President and General Manager, Mr. Thomas Ferry, met with Mr. Magruder on October 16, 2007, in Tucson. While UNS Electric does not believe that it has violated or neglected any terms of that agreement, UNS Electric continues to work with Mr. Magruder to address his concerns.

UNS Electric briefly addresses two allegations Mr. Magruder makes in his Opening Brief. First, Mr. Magruder states that "[e]ven though Mr. Pignatelli said seven scholarships have been awarded, my School Board contacts in Santa Cruz County state NONE have been awarded in compliance with this agreement." 133 Mr. Magruder's assertion has not been supported by any reliable evidence presented before the close of the evidentiary hearing on October 2, 2007. Regardless, Mr. Pignatelli was correct: UNS Electric has, in fact, awarded seven scholarships to Nogales High School students from 1999 to 2003 through the Nogales Educational Foundation. And, as Mr. Pignatelli stated at the hearing, UNS Electric will provide additional scholarships if that was the agreement. 134 Even though additional scholarships were not agreed upon, UNS Electric has nonetheless committed to fund additional scholarships not only for Nogales High School students, but also for Rio Rico High School students, over the next four years.

Second, Mr. Magruder states, at page 20, lines 17-24 of his Opening Brief, that 20 aboveground pole replacement projects, and 12 underground cable replacement projects, were not completed as scheduled. Again, Mr. Magruder presented no evidence to this point, other than his unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements. He further cites to no agreement that specifically requires completion of specific pole replacements that Mr. Magruder alleges need to be done. The

<sup>Tr. (Pignatelli) at 71-72.
Magruder Opening Brief at page 19, lines 10-12.
Tr. (Pignatelli) at 55.</sup> 

settlement agreement approved in Decision No. 61793 (June 29, 1999) between UNS Electric's predecessor and the City of Nogales contains no provision concerning pole replacements. The Company, in fact, developed a target of replacement projects; those projects were also researched and engineered in detail. Those facilities in need of replacement were replaced. UNS Electric has made numerous, significant reliability improvements in Santa Cruz County. Staff agrees that UNS Electric is supplying customers with reliable service and that its capital construction program was commensurate with a rapidly growing service territory. No party supports Mr. Magruder's unfounded assertions on this issue.

#### C. Payday Loan Businesses.

Mr. Magruder requests that the Company cease using "predatory" loan companies as billing agents to accept cash payments from its customers. The Company endeavors to provide convenient payment location options for all of its customers, and the Company believes that many customers like having this option available to them. UNS Electric continues to work, however, toward providing other locations where pay stations can be established.<sup>137</sup>

#### X. CONCLUSION

UNS Electric respectfully requests that the Commission issue a final order granting it relief as set forth in is Initial Post-Hearing Brief. UNS Electric has attached proposed findings of fact,

<sup>135</sup> Mr. Magruder's discussion of pole replacements spans from pages 30 through 35 of his Supplemental Direct Testimony (admitted as Exhibit No. M-23). He cites to no order specifically requiring approval

of the projects he lists, nor is there any evidence provided justifying his alleged claim that these projects had to be completed. Neither Decision No. 61793 (June 29, 1999) nor Decision No. 62011 (November

2, 1999) required replacement of the 20 specific projects he alleges need to be replaced. Further, Mr. Magruder makes vague reference to a Citizens Supplemental Plan that was never attached to any of his

testimonies. The Company assumes he is referring to a May 7, 1999, plan that alludes to pole replacements – which the Company attached as part of its February 9, 2004 filing in Docket No. E-

1032A-99-0401 concerning service quality issues in Santa Cruz County. Yet, the May 7, 1999 supplemental plan was not even mentioned, let alone required, per Decision Nos. 61793 or 62011.

Further, Mr. Magruder cites to no decision that approved the plan. In short, the Company had the discretion to determine which, if any, pole replacements were needed given the circumstances that

existed at that time. Finally, the Commission determined in Decision No. 67151 (August 3, 2004) addressed distribution reliability recommendations. Pole replacements were not mentioned in that

decision, although nine recommendations were approved by the Commission.

Ex. S-55 (Taylor Direct) at 6-7. Mr. Taylor's Direct Testimony was adopted by Staff witness Prem Bahl.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> Tr. (Ferry) at 517.

conclusions of law and ordering paragraphs as Attachment "A" to this Reply Brief that would 1 2 provide the Company the relief it is seeking in this case. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19<sup>th</sup> day of November 2007. 3 UNS Electric, Inc. 4 5 By 6 Michael W. Patten 7 Jason D. Gellman ROSHKA DEWULF & PATTEN, PLC. 8 One Arizona Center 400 East Van Buren Street, Suite 800 9 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 10 and 11 Raymond S. Heyman Michelle Livengood 12 UniSource Energy Services One South Church Avenue Tucson, Arizona 85702 13 14 Attorneys for UNS Electric, Inc. 15 Original and thirteen copies of the foregoing filed this 19<sup>th</sup> day of November 2007, with: 16 **Docket Control** 17 Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Street 18 Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered/mailed this 19<sup>th</sup> day of November 2007, to: 19 20 Chairman Mike Gleason 21 Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Street 22 Phoenix, Arizona 85007 23 Commissioner William A. Mundell Arizona Corporation Commission 24 1200 West Washington Street Phoenix, Arizona 85007 25 26

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# **ATTACHMENT**

"A"

## ATTACHMENT "A"

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Corporation Commission ("Commission") finds, concludes, and orders that:

FINDINGS OF FACT

Having considered the entire record herein and being fully advised in the premises, the Arizona

- 1. UNS Electric is a public service corporation engaged in furnishing electricity in the State of Arizona. UNS Electric provides retail electric service to customers in Mohave County and Santa Cruz County.
- 2. On December 15, 2006, UNS Electric filed with the Commission an application for an increase in rates and approval of financing.
  - 3. On January 11, 2007, UNS Electric filed a supplement to its application.
- 4. On January 12, 2007, the Commission's Utilities Division Staff filed a Letter of Sufficiency, notifying the Company that its application, as supplemented by the additional information filed on January 11, 2007, met the sufficiency requirements and classifying UNS Electric as a Class A utility.
- 5. On January 24, 2007, Staff filed a Request for Procedural Order, in which it requested a hearing date of September 10, 2007, and associated procedural deadlines.
- 6. By Procedural Order dated February 1, 2007, procedural timeframes were established and a hearing was scheduled to commence on September 10, 2007.
  - 7. Intervention was granted to RUCO and Mr. Magruder.
- 8. UNS Electric filed Direct Testimony with its application on December 15, 2006. Pursuant to Procedural Order dated January 12, 2007, Direct Testimony was filed on June 28, 2007 by Staff, RUCO and Mr. Magruder. Rate Design Direct Testimony was filed on July 12, 2007 by Staff, RUCO and Mr. Magruder.
- 9. UNS Electric filed Rebuttal Testimony on August 14, 2007. Staff, RUCO and Mr. Magruder filed Surrebuttal Testimony on August 24, 2007. UNS Electric filed Rejoinder Testimony on August 31, 2007.

10. The evidentiary hearing commenced as scheduled on September 10, 2007, at the Commission's offices in Phoenix, and additional hearing days were held on September 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 21 and October 2, 2007.

- 11. The Company filed Final Schedules on October 11, 2007. Staff filed Final Schedules on October 16, 2007. RUCO filed Final Schedules on October 17, 2007.
- 12. Initial Post-Hearing Briefs were filed by UNS Electric, Staff, RUCO and Mr. Magruder on November 5, 2007. All Parties filed Reply Briefs on November 19, 2007.
- 13. According to the Company's application, as modified, in the test year ended June 30, 2006, UNS Electric had adjusted operating income of \$8,770,016, on an adjusted Fair Value Rate Base of \$177,847,579 for a 4.93 percent rate of return.
- 14. In its application, as modified, the Company requested a revenue increase of \$8,468,638. Staff recommends a revenue increase of \$3,646,946. RUCO recommends a revenue increase of \$1,189,270.
- 15. For purposes of this proceeding, we determine that UNS Electric has an Original Cost Rate Base of \$141,036,562 and a Fair Value Rate Base of \$177,847,579.
- 16. The allowance of Construction Work in Progress ("CWIP") in rate base is a regulatory tool available to the Commission to address high growth and related regulatory lag and to protect a utility's financial integrity. Allowing CWIP in rate base can protect a utility's financial integrity and preserve access to capital on reasonable terms.
- 17. Allowing approximately \$10.8 million in rate base for UNS Electric will add \$2.1 million annually in revenues to the Company that will improve the Company's cash flow and allow it to protect its financial integrity. Protecting a utility's financial integrity is the determining factor to decide whether CWIP should be allowed in rate base. Moreover, the majority of projects were in-service as of June 30, 2007. Further, over half of the CWIP is for projects that are non-revenue producing and non-expense reducing. Because the specific facts and circumstances in this case support UNS Electric's need for such relief, UNS Electric is entitled to include \$10,761,154

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of CWIP in rate base.

- 18. In light of the short-term nature of the construction projects included in the test-year balance of CWIP, it is appropriate for UNS Electric to continue accruing AFUDC on all eligible construction projects with no offset required for the balance of CWIP included in rate base.
- 19. UNS Electric's depreciation study, submitted as part of Exhibit UNSE-32, as amended by Staff's adjustment to correct an inadvertent omission to include a 10 percent net salvage rate for UNS Electric transportation equipment, is reasonable and adopted herein.
  - 20. Cost of capital is a function of the risk to which the capital is exposed.
- 21. A weighted average cost of capital of 9.89 percent is reasonable, based on an 11.80 percent return on equity, 8.22 percent cost of long-term debt, 6.36 percent cost of short-term debt, and a capital structure consisting of 48.85 percent common equity, 47.18 percent long-term debt, and 3.97 percent short-term debt.
- 22. An authorized return on equity for UNS Electric equaling 11.80 percent is reasonable and is based on the Company's cost of common equity. UNS Electric is decidedly riskier than other electric utility distribution companies mentioned on the record and the holding companies used in the comparable company groups used by the witnesses to estimate cost of common equity. The evidence in the record is that UNS Electric has a speculative-grade credit rating and a lack of common dividend payment. UNS Electric also has all of its long-term debt maturing in August of 2008, and faces the need to replace its entire power supply portfolio upon termination of its full requirements power supply contract on May 31, 2008.
- 23. An 11.80 percent return on equity should allow UNS Electric to attract capital on reasonable terms, should ensure confidence in the financial soundness and integrity of the Company, should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.
  - 24. The Arizona Constitution and Arizona law require that fair value must be used to

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determine a fair rate of return.

- Staff's proposed method to determine a fair value rate of return using its zero investor supplied capital methodology does not meet the legal requirements to determine a fair rate of return based on Fair Value Rate Base. Assigning a cost rate value of zero to the amount above Original Cost Rate Base – or the amount Staff argued is not supplied by investor funds – does not take into account the fair value of the Company's rate base.
- 26. RUCO's proposed method to determine a fair value rate of return through the Commission's previous methodology also does not meet the legal requirements to determine a fair rate of return based on Fair Value Rate Base.
- The Company's proposal to apply 9.89 percent cost of capital to its Fair Value Rate Base of \$177,847,599 is the only legally-permissible approach put forth in this case, although the Commission is not bound to that approach. This would result in a required operating income of \$17,592,000; however, because the Company commits to limiting its required rate increase request to \$8,468,639, we will apply an overall rate of return on Fair Value Rate Base that takes this limitation into account. Rate Base.
- 28. Based upon the evidence submitted, the Company's proposed allocation of revenue requirement across customer classes is reasonable and is adopted herein.
- The rates for customer classes should be set based on the Company's rate design recommendation, with the customer charges for each class established at the level recommended by the Company and with Energy and Base Power Supply charges also based on the revenue requirement determined herein.
- 30. Mandatory TOU rates for new and moving residential, small general service customers and large general service customers with maximum demand less than 1,000 kW, as well as mandatory TOU rates for all large general service customers with greater than 1,000 kW maximum demand is reasonable as it will encourage customers to reduce load from the system's peak periods and is adopted herein. Further the Company's proposed TOU periods are

appropriately designed and are also adopted herein. These TOU periods are: Summer On-peak from 2:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.; Summer Shoulder from Noon to 2:00 p.m. and from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; Summer Off-peak from 8:00 p.m. to Noon; Winter On-peak from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.; and Winter Off-Peak from 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

- 31. The Company's proposed inverted-block (inclining block) rate structure for residential and small general service customers will encourage conservation and is adopted herein.
- 32. The Company's proposal to consolidate rates for Mohave and Santa Cruz County customers is appropriate because the systems are operating as one entity; therefore, the Company's proposal as supported by RUCO is adopted herein.
- 33. The Company's purchase power allocation of 50 percent average and peaks and 50 percent energy properly accounts for the influence of load factor and is adopted herein. But because the system load factor for UNS Electric is lower than TEP, using a purchased power allocation for UNS Electric with a high percentage of energy is reasonable. Therefore, we will order UNS Electric to use a purchased power allocation consisting of 60 percent energy and 40 percent demand (average and peaks) for its next general rate case.
- 34. For residential customers, the monthly customer charge should be increased from \$6.50 to \$7.70; with a non-TOU energy charge for the first 400 kWh of \$0.013012 and an energy charge for all additional kWhs of \$0.023012, and a residential base power supply charge of \$0.073771. For TOU rates, the following energy rates should be: a summer on-peak of \$0.087961; a summer shoulder of \$0.077581; a summer off-peak of \$0.072961; a winter on-peak of \$0.076651; and a winter off-peak of \$0.061651.
- 35. The Company's proposal to change the CARES discounts to set monthly amounts of \$8.00 for CARES customers and \$10.00 for Medical-CARES customers ensures that these customers receive the maximum discount available to them and decouples usage from receipt of the discount, is reasonable and is adopted herein.

36. Establishing a separate DSM Adjustor Mechanism for UNS Electric in this proceeding is reasonable and is adopted herein. All DSM costs will now be recovered through this DSM Adjustor Mechanism and not through base rates. The initial DSM Adjustor Rate will be \$0.000583 per kWh and will remain in effect until June 1, 2009. This reflects 100 percent of UNS Electric's LIW Program and 25 percent of its other DSM programs. In addition, it is reasonable to require UNS Electric to file semi-annual reports for the DSM programs, for UNS Electric to make its DSM Adjustor filing on April 1 of each year (starting in 2009), for an annual adjustment of UNS Electric's DSM Adjustor on June 1 (starting in 2009). Full review of UNS Electric's DSM Program Portfolio will take place in a separate docket (Docket No. E-04204A-07-0365, filed June 13, 2007).

37. UNS Electric's proposed change in Billing Terms to have 10 days before a customers' bills are considered past due – along with an additional 15 days before a bill is considered delinquent – is a reasonable modification that makes UNS Electric's billing terms consistent with those for UNS Gas, avoids confusion for customers served by both UNS Gas and UNS Electric, and is more lenient to the customer than what the Commission's rules allow and is adopted herein. Under the Company's Billing Terms, customers will have 25 total days before a bill is considered delinquent and before a late charge is rendered. Further, termination of service then cannot occur until an additional five days elapse and only after notice of termination is given.

- 38. The Company's service line extension proposal to reduce the service line extension allowance by 50 feet and eliminating the free allowance for a carryover pole is a reasonable means of increasing the new customer contributions and is adopted herein.
- 39. The Company's Service Connection Contribution is an additional fee to be accounted for as a non-refundable contribution in aid of construction to offset construction costs for new electric service connections. A \$250 Service Connection Contribution for each new electric service connection will reduce the future rate burden on existing customers due to system growth and is adopted herein. We believe, however, that waiving the Service Connection Contribution is

appropriate for those customers that build to UNS Electric's Energy Smart Homes efficiency standards.

- 40. The existing Purchased Power and Fuel Adjustor Clause ("PPFAC") for UNS Electric is not designed to address fuel and purchased power costs once UNS Electric's full requirements power supply contract with Pinnacle West Capital Corporation expires on May 31, 2008.
- 41. The forward-looking or prospective PPFAC as initially proposed by Staff and endorsed by the Company is the adjustor mechanism that will best ensure timely recovery of fuel and purchased power costs. This new PPFAC will be more responsive to changes in fuel and purchased power costs than the existing PPFAC.
- 42. The new PPFAC will take effect June 1, 2008, in accordance with the procedures described in this Decision. The Forward Component and True-Up Component for the PPFAC Year will be determined in accordance with the procedures described in this Decision. Any over-collection in the existing PPFAC bank balance will be addressed through the True-Up Component.
- 43. The new PPFAC will not at this time contain a sharing mechanism or a cap, for the reasons described herein.
- 44. The base power supply component for each class of customers proposed by the Company in its Rebuttal Testimony is reasonable and appropriate. The initial base power supply component for residential customers, for example, of \$0.073771 per kWh is reasonable and appropriate.
- 45. The recoverable costs through the PPFAC will include Other Allowable Costs identified by the Company in its proposed Plan of Administration, including credit costs, brokers fees and legal fees directly associated with the procurement of fuel and purchased power.
- 46. The new PPFAC as proposed by Staff and endorsed by UNS Electric is adopted as described herein.
  - 47. Black Mountain Generation Station ("BMGS") will provide financial and operational

benefits to UNS Electric and its customers if the Company owns the generation facility. Owning BMGS will likely result in lower long-term costs due to the accumulated effects of depreciation expense and deferred income taxes, thereby reducing the Company's revenue requirement relative to a purchase power contract or long-term lease agreement. BMGS also will provide enhanced reliability benefits, as well as flexibility of dispatch, operational control and a generating resource close to its load center.

- 48. UNS Electric's request for a post-test-year adjustment of \$60 million to rate base BMGS and for the related rate reclassification is reasonable.
- 49. The rate reclassification resulting from the post test year adjustment to rate base related to BMGS would subtract approximately 0.6 cents per kWh from the base power supply rate including fuel and purchased power and add approximately 0.6 cents per kWh into the base delivery rate. Specifically, the base power supply rate for residential customers of \$0.073711 per kWh would become \$0.067245 per kWh. The energy charge for the first 400 kWh would go from \$0.013056 to \$0.019693 for residential charges due to the change in the base delivery rate. The energy charge for all additional kWhs would go from \$0.023056 to \$0.029693.
- 50. The BMGS rate base adjustment and the related rate reclassification will not occur until UNS Electric shows BMGS to be in commercial operation. The Company will make a filing a project completion report upon project completion and 30 days before implementing its requested rate reclassification treatment. In no event will the rate base adjustment or rate reclassification take place before June 1, 2008.
- 51. The Company commitment to limit the purchase price to the actual cost of construction that UniSource Energy Development Corporation incurs is reasonable. If the actual costs exceed \$60 million, then those additional costs will be the subject of the next rate case.
- 52. The recommendation to allow Staff and other parties will have the right to review and evaluate the prudence of the construction costs for BMGS in the next rate case is reasonable.
  - 53. In order to acquire BMGS, UNS Electric also seeks authority to issue up to \$40

million in new debt securities in addition to any indebtedness arising out of transactions approved in Decision No. 69395 (March 22, 2007). The Company further desires authority to issue up to \$40 million in either long-term debt and/or short- to intermediate-term debt with the authority to refinance any short- or intermediate-term debt into long-term debt when the Company believes market conditions are favorable to do so.

- 54. In connection with any debt issuance, UNS Electric seeks authority to grant a lien on some or all of its properties including the properties acquired with the proceeds of this financing as well as properties acquired after the date the lien is granted to secure its obligations under the debt for which authorization is sought and to secure any other obligations of UNS Electric existing at the time such lien is granted which need to be secured if such lien is granted.
- 55. The Company also seeks authority to receive up to \$40 million in additional equity, in connection with the proposed acquisition of BMGS, to allow the Company to maintain a balanced capital structure.
- 56. Staff recommends approving UNS Electric's request for approval of financing in its rate application with the following conditions:
  - That UNS Electric file a report with Docket Control demonstrating that the Company had a DSC and a TIER ratio equal to or greater than 1.0 within 60 days from the close of each new debt financing under this docket.
  - That UNS Electric file a report with Docket Control within 60 days from the close of each financing package describing the transaction and demonstrating that the terms are consistent with those generally available to comparable entities.
- 57. Staff's conditions for approving the financing request are reasonable and we will adopt them.

## **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

1. UNS Electric, Inc. is a public service corporation within the meaning of the Arizona Constitution, Article XV, and under A.R.S. Title 40, generally.

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- 2. The Commission has jurisdiction over UNS Electric, Inc. and this proceeding.
- 3. Notice of the proceeding has been given in the manner prescribed by law.
- 4. The rates, charges, approvals and conditions of service established herein are just and reasonable and in the public interest.
- 5. As conditioned herein, the Company's request for financing of up to \$40 million in debt and up to \$40 million in equity approved herein is for lawful purposes within UNS Electric's corporate powers, is compatible with the public interest, with sound financial practices and with the proper performance by UNS Electric of service as a public service corporation, and will not impair the Company's ability to provide electric service.
- 6. The financing authority approved herein is for the purposes as stated in the application and at the hearing, is reasonably necessary for those purposes, and such purposes are not, wholly or in part, reasonably chargeable to operating expenses or income.

## **ORDER**

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. is hereby authorized and directed to file with the Commission, on or before January 31, 2008, revised schedules of rates and charges consistent with the discussion herein and a proof of revenues showing that, based on the adjusted test-year level of sales, the revised rates will produce no more than the authorized increase in gross revenues.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the revised schedules of rates and charges shall be effective for all service rendered on and after February 1, 2008.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. shall notify its customers of the revised schedules of rates and charges authorized herein by means of an insert in its next regularly scheduled billing and by posting on its website, in a form approved by the Commission's Utilities Division Staff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED adopting the depreciation rates as proposed by the Company in its depreciation study and incorporating the correction from Staff.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. shall use a purchased power allocation consisting of 60 percent energy and 40 percent demand (average and peaks) for its next general rate case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED establishing a DSM Adjustor Mechanism as described in this order, with an initial rate of \$0.000583 per kWh.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. shall make its DSM Adjustor filing by April 1<sup>st</sup> of each year, starting in 2009.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. shall file semi-annual reports for its DSM programs in accordance with Staff's recommendations.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. shall file, as a compliance item in this Docket, the final conformed Plan of Administration for the Purchased Power and Fuel Adjustment Clause consistent with this Decision, within 30 days of this Decision.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon acquisition of Black Mountain Generation Station, UNS Electric, Inc. shall make a post-test-year adjustment to rate base of \$60 million as of June 1, 2008 or the date on which Black Mountain Generation Station is in commercial operation, whichever is later.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon acquisition of Black Mountain Generation Station, UNS Electric, Inc. shall reclassify its rates by reducing base power supply charge by approximately 0.6 cents per kWh and increasing the base delivery charge by approximately 0.6 cents per kWh, depending on customer class, as of June 1, 2008 or the date on which Black Mountain Generation Station is in commercial operation, whichever is later.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. shall file a project completion report 30 days before rate basing Black Mountain Generation Station and making the rate reclassification.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the acquisition cost of Black Mountain Generation Station will be limited to the actual cost of completion to UniSource Energy Development Company, and that any costs in excess of \$60 million shall be subject to further review and

consideration in UNS Electric, Inc.'s subsequent rate case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Staff and other parties will have the right to review and evaluate the prudence of the construction costs of the Black Mountain Generation Station in UNS Electric, Inc.'s subsequent rate case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. is hereby authorized to issue up to \$40 million in either long-term debt and/or short- to intermediate-term debt, for the purpose of acquiring BMGS; and is further authorized to refinance any short- or intermediate-term debt into long-term debt, without further order by the Commission, when the Company believes market conditions are favorable to do so.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. is hereby authorized to receive an additional amount of up to \$40 million of equity for the purpose of acquiring Black Mountain Generation Station.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. is hereby authorized to grant a lien on some or all of its properties – including the properties acquired with the proceeds of this financing and properties acquired after the date of the grant of the lien – to secure the obligations under the debt for which authorization is sought and to secure any other obligations of UNS Electric, Inc. existing at the time such lien is grant which need to be secured if such lien is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. is hereby authorized to engage in transactions and to execute or cause to be executed any documents or modifications to existing transaction documents necessary to effectuate the authorizations requested from UNS Electric, Inc. in connection with the financing of the BMGS purchase.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. is hereby authorized to execute, deliver, and perform all contracts, agreements and other instruments incidental to any or all of the financing sought for Black Mountain Generation Station or otherwise deemed by UNS Electric, Inc. to be necessary, desirable or appropriate in connection with this financing request.

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1	IT IS FURTHER O	RDERED that UNS Electric,	Inc. file a report in this Docket		
2	demonstrating that the Company had a DSC and a TIER ratio greater than 1.0 within 60 days from				
3	the close of each new debt financing under this Docket.				
4	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that UNS Electric, Inc. file a report in this Docket, within 60				
5	days from the close of each financing package, describing the transaction and demonstrating that				
6	the terms are consistent with those generally available to comparable entities.				
7	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Decision shall become effective immediately.				
8	BY ORDER O	F THE ARIZONA CORPORAT	ION COMMISSION.		
9					
10					
11	CHAIRMAN		COMMISSIONER		
12					
13					
14	COMMISSIONER	COMMISSIONER	COMMISSIONER		
15		IN WITNESS V	VHEREOF, I, DEAN S. MILLER,		
16		Interim Execut Corporation Com	mission, have hereunto set my hand		
17		affixed at the Ca	fficial seal of the Commission to be apitol, in the City of Phoenix, this		
18		day of	, 2007.		
19					
20		DEAN S. MILLE INTERIM EXEC	ER FUTIVE DIRECTOR		
21					
22	DISSENT				
23	DISSENT				
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27			Decision No.		